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Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge of the United States Court of*
International Trade, sitting by designation.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 04-4215
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
MARCUS WILLIAMS,
a/k/a
JAMAR MOFIELD
a/k/a
MARCUS ROLLERSON,
Marcus Williams,
a/k/a Marcus Rollerson,
                               Appellant
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00172-37)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 2, 2006
Before: SLOVITER and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,  Judge.*
Appellant was identified in the indictment as Marcus Williams, a/k/a Jamar1
Mofiield, a/k/a Marcus Rollerson.  At trial, defense counsel informed the District Court
that the Appellant’s real name is Marcus Rollerson and that is how he was identified
throughout the trial.   
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(Filed: March 15, 2006 )
_______________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Marcus Williams, a/k/a Marcus Rollerson  (“Rollerson”) appeals his conviction1
arising from a multi-defendant narcotics conspiracy case.  Rollerson argues that he was
deprived of his due process right to a fair trial as a result of the Government’s
presentation of false testimony by two alleged co-conspirators.  For the reasons stated
below, we will affirm Rollerson’s conviction.
I.  Background
As we write solely for the parties, our recitation of the facts will be limited to those
necessary to our determination.  On December 8, 2001, Rollerson was arrested on the
second floor of a narcotics stash house located at 636 North Brooklyn Street in
Philadelphia.  Police found more than 145 grams of crack cocaine, 20 grams of cocaine,
numerous items used to manufacture and package crack cocaine, five loaded firearms,
numerous cellular telephones and two-way radios, and more than $4,000 in small
denominations of cash throughout the house and on the persons of Rollerson and a second
3individual found in the house.   
On October 24, 2002, Rollerson, along with 36 co-defendants, was indicted for
participating in a massive cocaine and crack conspiracy that lasted from 1997 to 2002 and
spanned Philadelphia, western Pennsylvania, Delaware, and other locations.  Rollerson
was charged with: conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a) and (b)(1)(A); possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within 1,000
feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); possession of a firearm in furtherance
of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Prior to trial, the Government dismissed
two of the counts: possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a
school, and felon in possession of a firearm.  
At trial, the evidence presented by the Government included the testimony of
Courtney Carter and Tracey Teagle, who testified to their drug dealing activities in
general and their observations of Rollerson at or near the narcotics stash house located at
636 North Brooklyn Street.  The Government stipulated at trial that Rollerson was in jail
during 1999, 2000, and the first eight months of 2001.  However, in the course of
testifying that Rollerson was one of co-defendant Malik Williams’s “boys” at or near the
North Brooklyn Street stash house (Carter) and was dealing narcotics near the stash house
(Teagle), both Carter and Teagle at times made statements implying that they saw
4Rollerson in 2000.  Nonetheless, when pressed by counsel to pinpoint precisely when they
encountered Rollerson at or near the stash house, Carter and Teagle repeatedly stated that
they were unsure of when they observed him.
At the close of the Government’s case, Rollerson moved for a directed verdict of
acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Rollerson attacked the testimony of
Carter and Teagle, but did not raise a due process claim.  The District Court denied the
motion.  The jury subsequently convicted Rollerson of the three remaining counts against
him: conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. 
The District Court sentenced Rollerson to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment. 
He received 240 months as to both the conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute
counts, to run concurrently, and 60 months as to the possession of a firearm in furtherance
of drug trafficking count, to run consecutively.  
II.  Discussion
Rollerson appeals only his conviction, arguing that two of the Government’s
witnesses testified falsely that Rollerson was at or near a narcotics stash house and
dealing narcotics in the vicinity of that stash house during 2000, which is when Rollerson
was incarcerated on unrelated charges.  Rollerson thus claims that he was deprived of his
due process right to a fair trial as a result of the Government’s presentation of false
5testimony.  
At the outset, we note that Rollerson did not raise his due process argument in the
District Court.  Rollerson’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal was based on his claim that the
Government failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.  In particular,
Rollerson’s motion did not allege that the witnesses perjured themselves, or that the
Government knowingly introduced false testimony, which are the essential elements of
the due process claim he makes on appeal.  Accordingly, because Rollerson did not raise
the due process argument below as a grounds for acquittal, the plain error standard
governs his request for relief.
Under plain error review, “before an appellate court can correct an error not raised
at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.  If
all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a
forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v.
Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  The “plain-error exception to the
contemporaneous-objection rule is to be ‘used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in
which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.’”  United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)).  It is
Rollerson’s burden to establish plain error.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 734-35
6(1993).
Rollerson’s due process claim cannot succeed under plain error review.  The
Government stipulated to the fact of Rollerson’s incarceration, which contradicted any
suggestion by Carter and Teagle that Rollerson was at or near the narcotics stash house in
2000, and defense counsel fully exploited this fact on cross-examination of the
Government witnesses.  Thus, the witnesses’ statements concerning when they claimed to
have seen Rollerson were part of the disputed facts that were submitted to the jury as the
finder of fact.  The jury was entitled to consider the testimony of Carter and Teagle, as
well as the other evidence presented by the Government, and determine for itself the
credibility and weight of their testimony that they observed Rollerson engaged in
activities consistent with a narcotics conspiracy.  Accordingly, Rollerson has not
established that the District Court erred by not finding a due process violation based on
the testimony of Carter and Teagle.
III.  Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm Rollerson’s conviction.
            
.
/s/ Julio M. Fuentes
      Circuit Judge
